When Theresa May called the UK's most recent general election on 18 April 2017, she seemed to have an unassailable lead. Opinion polls showed that the Conservatives were riding high and May had the highest personal ratings of any leader since Margaret Thatcher. How on earth did she blow it and end up with a minority government? This was a really interesting story.
In this opinion piece, I am combining my educational background and interest in politics and history with insight from my job as a communication skills coach and trainer. I’d love to get your views on this piece. If you agree, please like and comment. If you disagree, tell me. If I have missed a point, add it. If you want to share, please do. Here we go...
Out of focus
Our first past the post system requires a carefully planned election campaign strategy to defend and convert marginal seats. Instead of doing this May threw caution to the wind and went for broke. Believing in her infallibility, she put nearly all her effort into campaigning in a high number of Labour strongholds, thinking she could convert many of Labour’s supporters on the back of her apparent popularity. Targeting areas in England and Wales that voted to leave in the referendum, May thought she would hoover up most of the UKIP votes. It was a gamble and it backfired badly. May failed to convert most of her targets. Perhaps even more seriously for her, May took for granted and neglected her core base in Conservative-held seats. It was these Tory held seats in our cities that fell to Labour. It was unthinkable until this election that a seat such as Kensington, one of London’s wealthiest constituencies could fall to Labour for the first time.
Credit where it is due. The Conservatives did get their targeting right in Scotland. Under Ruth Davidson's leadership, the Tories gained 12 new seats at the expense of the SNP. Labour and the Lib Dems also advanced. The major issue in favour of the UK-wide parties in Scotland, was Nicola Sturgeon's unpopular call for a second independence referendum.
Selling the wrong product
May was selling us two things. Her leadership competence and ability to get the right Brexit deal. I’ll return to her leadership competence in a moment. On Brexit, May was seeking to convince us that she needed a stronger mandate to negotiate the right deal with the EU. Here she met with an immediate roadblock. The reaction of many of the 48% of voters who voted to remain in 2016, was an unwillingness to give May the blank cheque she was demanding. In fact, seeing her lurch towards a hard Brexit, many people voted to put her on a shorter leash. We saw in this election a “revenge of the Remainers”.
Another problem with calling this election on Brexit, was that most people didn’t believe Brexit was the only show in town. Having suffered from years of austerity, people are intensely concerned about the quality of our public services and are reawakening to the question of social justice. Labour released their manifesto first. It was a clear promise to restore public services, to deal with social inequality and build a fairer society. While many quite rightly questioned its financial feasibility, it was at least costed, was clear and showed vision.
May’s manifesto by comparison was a disaster. People were expecting something transformative from her. Something in keeping with her promise when taking office that she would address the injustice in our society. On the steps of 10 Downing Street Theresa May had, in a passionate and widely praised speech, pledged that "the Government I lead will be driven, not by the interests of the privileged few, but by yours". Her manifesto broke this promise. It was a damp and festering squib, promising little to restore public services and even less for the ‘just about managing’. Having parked her seemingly compassionate tanks on Labour’s territory when taking office, here May drove them back to the Tory Party barracks and turned out the lights. Immediately, May’s social care plans were dubbed a “dementia tax” alienating a core part of her base - older voters. Her plan to take away free school meals alienated parents and cast her as the “lunch pincher”. May’s defence that her manifesto was doing what we could afford, didn’t cut it. By this point, many of her traditional supporters were angry and not listening. Her argument was further undermined by the fact that her manifesto was not even costed.
This was a shocking manifesto on which to fight an election. Not only were its policies out touch with the people, it was singularly lacking in any positive and passionate appeal. It did create an emotional response - it created fear among many older voters and a sense of disappointment and betrayal from her core voters. The manifesto showed that May was out of touch with her core supporters let alone the mood of the public. The manifesto was a gift to Labour and a key turning point in the campaign.
Failed to show
During a TV leaders debate, Caroline Lucas of the Green Party declared "the first rule of leadership is showing up". May had not showed up, sending instead her second in command Amber Rudd to debate with Corbyn and the other leaders. This was a lost opportunity for May to communicate with her audience, but worse, it communicated that she was too arrogant, aloof, uncaring or perhaps even scared to do so. Trust was broken. This was another key turning point in the campaign.
May made the campaign personal. She declared it was about voting for her ‘strong and stable’ leadership. May plastered her name over all communications to voters, in some cases barely revealing the Conservative Party logo. She made the election a confidence vote in Theresa May. She hid most of her senior team from television and radio performances. By contrast Corbyn showed up in the debates, he showed up in large rallies, he showed up on radio shows and he allowed his senior team members to take to the airwaves. It wasn’t all plain sailing (he had a disastrous radio 4 interview in which he vainly reached for his iPad to find his costings and other team members made worse gaffes), but the more people saw of him, the more they respected his conviction and many even grew to like him. While Theresa May was increasingly seen as arrogant and aloof, Corbyn appeared to many as honest and down to earth.
Theresa May framed the election as a vote for confidence in her leadership. When she failed to show and U-turned on social care at the slightest resistance, she suddenly looked weak, indecisive and out of touch even with her core supporters. Her leadership qualities were found wanting.
The rise of the Maybot
During a TV debate when asked what qualities he felt a strong leader needs, Corbyn highlighted being able to listen. Corbyn either consciously or unwittingly tapped into a growing vein of discontent among the electorate. Even before the snap election was called, there was a growing sense that May was not listening. Her mantras “Brexit means Brexit” and we will secure a “Red White and Blue Brexit”, were empty and devoid of the appreciation that many people are concerned about ‘how’ we Brexit. Further evidence for May’s seeming lack of accountability was seen in her rather robotic communications. “Strong and stable, strong and stable, strong and stable…”. What began as May’s strong hand, became her greatest weakness. The repeated over use of this mantra began to grate on voters who wanted to hear more of the detail and less of the slogan. When answering questions, every sentence seemed to begin with the same phrases, “what’s important…” or ‘it’s clear...” as if her answers were pre-programmed. May was dubbed the “Maybot” and it stuck.
In contrast, Corbyn was increasingly perceived to be the authentic candidate, not afraid to fight for his beliefs, to answer questions and talk substance on the issues. In contrast to May’s robotic presence, Corbyn showed fire in his belly and communicated with passion. It showed he cared, people started to believe in him and it began to be infectious. As May’s leadership popularity was plummeting, Corbyn’s stock was rising sharply.
Corbyn even sculpted his beard and bought himself a sharp new dark suit to show off his bright red tie. This was a dramatic upgrade on his usual uncut look - he began to look more like a leader. Both May and Corbyn had bad moments on air but you could sense that Corbyn was increasingly enjoying himself. On stage May looked shaken when she was defending her social care U-turn. Corbyn in contrast remained calm in the face of nearly all the heat thrown at him. No surprise since he’s been doing that for the last two years - it was business as usual.
Social failure
The Conservatives lost the online communications battle. The agency 'We are Social' reported that Labour increased its following by 61% on Facebook, Intagram and Twitter in the course of the campaign, the Conservatives increased theirs only by 6%. This was a catastrophically bad performance by the Tories and no doubt a major contributor to the election result. Just as Theresa May spent her time on the campaign bus in Labour held seats, so too did the Tories commit their social media resources to attracting new voters, rather than targeting their base support. They were going deep into Labour territory and forgot their own backyard. Labour, by contrast fought a more broadly spread online war. Crucially, they appear to have won the hearts and minds of young people who are highly active on social media. A key element was Labour's growing support from key influencers from the music business - Lowkey, Stormzy and others. Unlike the unhelpful (that's being kind) intervention from Russell Brand in 2015, this time respected celebrities had a significant impact in favour of Labour.
Why was social media so important? The UK's traditional newspapers no longer have the power they once held to influence elections. Media such as The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, The Sun and Daily Mirror have the power to entrench views among their readerships, but they have limited power to crossover and convert new voters. Facebook is now the kingmaker. Sure it carries news from traditional media outlets, but it also carries content from a multitude of other sources. Crucially, it carries news from your friends. Friends who just like we are doing here today, increasingly express their opinions online. We trust our friends more than we do politicians and journalists, so these opinions really count.
No flex
With polls narrowing and the Tory Manifesto going down like a lead balloon, you might have expected that Theresa May would change tack. Instead, she focused ever harder on her messages around 'strong and stable' leadership and getting the right Brexit deal. May's campaign was steered by Sir Lynton Crosby, David Cameron's strategist. His strategy followed conventional wisdom - set out your stool and then stick to it, no matter what. If you face resistance, double down. This was the same tactic used by the Remain referendum campaign leadership. The Remain campaign was widely criticised for not having dealt with the immigration issue, when it emerged as a significant factor in the referendum campaign. The remain team was almost silent on the issue. In the same way, May failed to address the austerity issue when it became clear that this was a key issue for voters in her target seats. Neither did May nuance her 'hard' stance on Brexit, to assuage voters in Conservative held 'Remain' territory. Nor did May shift resources to start defending her vulnerable Conservative-held seats. Doubling down in the face of resistance is one thing, but if it's clear you are losing the battle, you have to change your tactics.
False confidence
Theresa May might have acted differenty if she had the right data. Nearly all the opinion polls got it very badly wrong. Only one got it absolutely right – Survation. When all other polls were showing a 20 point plus lead for the Conservatives, Survation showed only an 11 point gap. That gap then narrowed to just one point in the final Survation opinion poll the day before the election. As one post-election facebook post declared, “it was those pesky kids that did it”. And it was. Survation was the outlying opinion poll because they had put a far greater weight on young people turning out to vote. They did at a historically high level – and overwhelmingly voted Labour. Survation showed that May's lead at the start of the campaign was strong, but never unassailable.
Fail to prepare, prepare to fail
Despite calling the snap election, May and the Conservative Party were unprepared. The Labour Party were not. The party had clearly planned for the possibility of an early election. Corbyn and his team were battle ready. They were also battled hardened. Unlike May whose party had given her a coronation last summer, Corbyn had fought and won two leadership elections in the last two years. He had gained valuable campaign experience and was ready to hit the road running. That’s just what he did.
It boils down to this
May badly misjudged her gamble for a bigger mandate (most of the public didn't want the election), she showed scant appreciation of the public’s hopes and fears, failed to show up at key election debates, sold her message to the wrong people (neglecting the core Tory vote), framed her proposition around Brexit (bringing on the revenge of the Remainers), failed to address concerns about austerity and public services, emphasised her leadership qualities then failed to demonstrate them, underestimated the opposition (Corbyn and the Labour party machine), failed to change tactics when things were going from bad to worse, failed to prepare adequately and was hugely over-confident.
Finally, a lesson from history
The last time a Prime Minister called a snap election with the intent of gaining a larger majority was in 1974. Against the backdrop of the oil price hikes of '73, fuel shortages, the three day working week and conflict with the National Union of Mineworkers, Ted Heath called a snap election in February 1974 with a plea for the electorate to 'return a strong government with a firm mandate'. The election resulted in a hung parliament and unable to form a majority coalition, Heath made way for Labour's Harold Wilson. Theresa May would have been wise to consider the lesson. She had been in post for less than twelve months since her assent to power as Conservative Party leader and by default, Prime Minister. The country were perhaps in no mood to give May a second coronation. Theresa May framed the question – who governs the country? The public gave their answer - "we do".
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About the author
Marco Smith is the Managing Director of Grow the Top Line, a coaching and training practice that helps companies and individuals to grow. To start a conversation about how we can help, call Marco on +44 (0)7912 120473, email: marco@growthetopline.com or visit www.growthetopline.com
